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Abstract
This paper investigates the economic factors underlying decoloniza-
tion, an institutional development of paramount importance in the history
of most developing countries. I build a simple trade model of colonialism
linking decolonization to the evolution of world factor endowments. In
the model, a labour (or land) intensive colony and its capital intensive
colonizer trade, creating gains from trade. These are then shared accord-
ing to the balance of power existing between the two countries: while the
colonizer control formal political power, the colony can stage a successfull
revolution at some stochastic cost. The allocation of gains from trade is
also determined by the fact that the rest of the world is interested in trad-
ing with the two countries. The more similar is the rest of the world to the
colonizer in terms of factor endowments, the higher the incentives for the
colony to stage a revolution, the larger the probability that the colonizer
must surrender gains from trade and, possibly, grant independence.
JEL Codes: D74, F13, H77.
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1 Introduction
There is a recent and growing literature in economics which tries to explain
how political events or the evolution of political institutions are determined
by economic factors. For example, Roemer (1985) and Grossman (1991, 1993)
study the determinants of revolutions; Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Jack
and Laguno¤ (2007) study the decision by the elite to extend the franchise;
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001 and 2006) study the establishment and stability
of democracy and dictatorship. This article seeks to analyse the decision by
some country to give up control over another country, after it conquered and
administered it for some time. In particular, it is concerned with the decision
by European powers to surrender control over their colonies at various points
in time during the past two centuries. In this sense, it stands in a very narrow
strand of economic literature (Grossman, 1993; Grossman, 1995).
To a political economist, decolonization is an interesting political event for
a number of reasons. First, it marked the end of an institutional arrangement
(colonialism) which is known to have had signicant inuence on subsequent
economic development. Second, for many countries it marked the beginning of
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a period of very uncertain institutional development: for example, a period of
frequent institutional changes (as in Latin America) or one which saw the per-
sistence of largely kleptocratic states (as in Africa). Third, if one is interested
in the economic determinants of the institutions of international relations, de-
colonization provides a good example of a rapid and substantial change in such
institutions.
Contemporary economists have devoted much attention to the impact of
colonialism on development. For example, Grier (1998) nds that among for-
mer colonies, countries that were colonized for longer periods performed better
in terms of subsequent GDP growth; Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2000) argue that
comparative institutional development in the American continent can be pre-
dicted by the interaction of natural endowments and European colonialism;
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) study the impact of di¤erent types of coloniza-
tion on subsequent institutional development and economic performance; and
Bertocchi and Canova (2002) show, for the case of Africa, that colonial origins
and economic penetration are good predictors of various economic and social
indicators, that are commonly used to predict growth1 . Only a few papers (for
example, Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2000, and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001)
have provided some theoretical explanations for this evidence, based on the
di¤erent type of institutions implanted by colonizers in di¤erent countries.
At the same time, there have been many studies explaining poor post colo-
nial institutional development: to quote only two, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) and Padro-i-Miquel, (2006) give theories which explain, respectively, the
frequent regime changes of Latin America and the persistence of kleptocratic
regimes in Africa. Interestingly, no formal paper in economics has yet attempted
at analysing the interation between post-colonial institutional development and
the action of the former colonizers, perhaps because of the shadow of ideology
cast over this topic by the economic debate in the 1960s and 1970s.
Very little attention instead has been devoted by economists on the economic
determinants of international relations: all modern models of the international
economy (nancial ows, trade, aid,) take the institutions of international rela-
tions (intended as the rules which determines the inuence of one country over
policy in another) as given. Focusing on the case of decolonization, this paper
builds a simple trade model in which the institutions of international relations
are determined endogenously. Appropriately extended, I believe my model will
yield a framework to studying how the actions of former colonizers might have
a¤ected post colonial institutional and economic development at the same time.
There is a large literature which deals with decolonization at large, and with
the economic reasons for it in the specic. To the best of my knowledge, however,
the only work that carries out a formal analysis of this topic are two papers by
Herschel Grossman (1993, 1995). In the rst and most relevant of these, the
author adapt a general equilibrium model of revolutionary activity to argue that
indigenous population growth combined with the structure of the labour market
in some colonies increased the private returns to subversive activity, until the
colonies became a net burden to the colonizers.
My paper provides an alternative explanation for why at some point in time
colonialism became an unprotable business. The model links decolonization
1Many more studies could be cited: for example Alam (1994), La Porta et Alii (1999) and
Fielding and Torres (2005).
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to the evolution of world factor endwoments and trade patterns. In its simple
environment, a labour (or land) intensive colony and its capital intensive colo-
nizer trade, creating substantial gains from trade. The way in which gains from
trade are shared between the two countries depends on the balance of power be-
tween the two: while the colonizers control formal political power, the colonized
have the ability to stage a successfull revolution at some stochastic cost. The
allocation of gains from trade between the two countries is also inuenced by
the fact that the rest of the world is interested in trading with the them, but in
ways which depend on its relative capital intensity. The more capital intensive
is the rest of the world relative to the colonizer, the higher the incentives for the
colony to stage a revolution, the larger the probability that the colonizer has to
grant independence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some support
for the decision to take a trade view of colonialism. Section 3 describes the
economic and political models and solves for the overall equilibrium. Section 4
discusses a few important features of the model. Section 5 talks briey about
the further work that I am planning to undertake, and concludes.
2 Colonialism and trade
Western colonialism took many forms in modern history. From the early phase
of expansion (of the Portuguese and Spanish in XV century; of the English,
French and Dutch in XVI century) down to the rst wave of decolonization
(the Americas around 1800), the New Imperialism of late XIX century, and
the second wave of decolonization after WWII, di¤erent colonizers have sought
to defend their interest in the colonial business through very di¤erent military,
administrative and economic structure.
From an economic perspective, one feature of Western colonialism that has
remained remarkably constant over time is the importance of trade. After an
initial phase of conquest, in which the main return on the military e¤orts of the
colonizers was the appropriation of precious materials and slaves, colonies and
protectorates incorporated in the European empires were normally introduced
into a trade circuit through which their abundant endowments of labour and
natural resources could be exploited. Only to some extent this trade was vol-
untary (i.e: subject to a set of rules, but based on the free productive decisions
of people living in the colonies): while in settlerscolonies like Canada or Aus-
tralia trade was on an entirely voluntary basis, in most Latin American colonies
production for export was based on the massive use of slave or forced labour,
and the only voluntary party in the colonial trade was an elite of European de-
scent. In any case, abstracting from local political arrangements, an element of
voluntary exchange between the colony and the mother country was implanted
very soon after the establishment of administrative control.
Typically, the patterns of trade saw the colonies exporting precious metals,
agricultural commodities and minerals to Europe in exchange for manufactures
of various types. Very often, colonial endowments were built up by European
colonizers with a view to exploit natural resources in the most convenient way to
European interests. This was carried out both through ows of private European
investments and by public intervention.
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The substance of colonial domination was the direct control of colonial policy
by the government of the mother country. Even when a limited form of adminsi-
trative independence was conceded, however (as in the case of the British West
Indies, who elected representative bodies empowered to inuence policy in some
domains), trade policy remained under the strict control of the mother coun-
try. This was because trade policy became one of the main tools through which
Europeans sought to extract value from their colonies: through such arrange-
ments as monopolies and tari¤s, colonizers sistematically manipulated the terms
of trade in their favour, leaving colonies with just a little share of what were
the huge gains from the colonial trade. Monopolies in particular had a strong
persistence over time: famous examples are the Spanish monopoly over South
American trade, which lasted from XVI to early XIX century, or the British
Navigation Laws, which lasted from 1651 to 1822. That such monopolies were
important was very clear to the early economists. For example, Adam Smith
wrote that:
"The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more
properly perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion which great Britain
assumes over her colonies" from "The Wealth of Nations".
Besides trade policy, Europeans used several tools to extract gains from
trade from the colonies. For example, in British settlerscolonies all unused land
belonged to the Crown, and was normally o¤ered for sale to those who wanted
to implant some economic activity on it. Further, several land-related activities
were subject to the disbursment of yearly licence fees. Land revenues were
collected by the colonial government on behalf of the Crown, and considered as
being "hold in trust by the Crown for the Empire as a whole" (Mc Minn, 1979).
As the coloniesexport developed, land revenues went up, transferring a large
share of colonial revenues under control of the Crown. This was a major source
of contrast between, for example, the British government and Australian settlers
down to 1855, when control of land revenues by the Crown was surrendered upon
the concession of Responsible Government.
In colonies which had a large indigenous population and a comparatively
smally share of settlers2 , European powers favoured the establishment of ex-
tractive institutions: through these, and with some military assistance from
Europe, an elite of settlers exploited the rest of the indigenous population. This
was the case of several American colonies, among which Peru, Brasil, the British
and Dutch West Indies and the US South. As mentioned above, trade in this
cases was only partially voluntary; even in these cases, however, the policy tools
described above (monopolies, tari¤s) were used to make sure that a large share
of gains from colonial trade were transferred from the colonial elite to the mother
country.
The importance of trade in the colonial business is evident from the expe-
rience of countries or regions which never became real "colonies" but were at
2There are a few famous theories for why some colonies received a large number of settlers,
and some didnt. For example, Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2000) argue that settlers were driven
by market forces towards territories in which natural endowments (and the lack of a large
indigenous population) made their activity more valuable; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) support the view according to which settlersmortality was the key determinant of
immigration ows.
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some point put under the "protection" of some European power. This form
of colonialism (which was practiced by all European countries but especially
by the British) was favoured when outright conquer resulted too expensive be-
cause of the existence of powerful local polities. What "Protection" implied was
the security of the existing local elite against the potential aggression of the
protector or some other European power; in exchange for this, the protector
normally imposed a policy of open trade and free capital movements at some
very favourable conditions. Thus, the experience of protectorates reinforces the
impression that the irrevocable ingredient of colonialism was indeed trade.
Throughout history, competition between colonizers was always very strong.
It was especially strong, however, at times in which the convergence in the eco-
nomic structure of European countries placed them in the need of similar colonial
trading partners. This was particularly evident in the era of the "Scrumble for
Africa", or New Imperialism (1880-1914). At that time, the Industrial Revo-
lution had reached its maturity and France and Germany had caught up with
Britain in terms of the capital intensity of their economies, and the strong
demand for food and raw materials by these three European countries (and by
Italy to a smalle extent) created the conditiong for the armed partition of Africa
in three large areas of inuence.
In the next section, I am presenting a simple Hecksher-Ohlin model of colo-
nialism which builds on the observation made above. Through this, I seeks to
address the question of why, at some point in time, the European powers lost
their colonies. While the simplicity of the model is in no way su¢ cient to ac-
count for the many aspects of colonial trade, I believe it captures one key force
at play at the time of decolonization.
3 The model
3.1 Economic model
3.1.1 Environment
There are three countries, H, F and E: H is the colony, F is the colonizer and
E a third country external to the colonial relation 3 . Each country is inhabited
by a mass 1 of agents. Endowments of labour (L) and capital (K) are
LH = 1 KH = K
LE = 1 KE = K (1 + )
LF = 1 KF = K (1 + )
where ;  > 0, and  > . In words, I am assuming that H is the labour inten-
3Notice that this simple framework is yet somewhat exible: F can represent not only the
the mother country, but the mother country and all her other colonies; and E can represent
a single country as well as the rest of the world.
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sive country, F is the capital intensive country, and E is somewhere between the
two4 . All citizens own exactly one unit of labour, and citizens in each country
own an equal share of national capital.
Two goods are produced and consumed, x and y. Production technologies
are equal across countries:
x = L (1)
y = K
Similarly, preferences are equal across countries and are described by the
utility function
uiJ = u
 
xiJ ; yiJ

=
 
xiJ
 1
2
 
yiJ
 1
2 (2)
where xiJ and yiJ are the demand for goods x and y respectively, by citizen
i in country J . Given that citizens within each country have homogeneous
endowments, they will all have the same demand schedule: we can thus drop
the upper script i from now on5 .
If pJ is the price ratio (p
J
x
pJy
) faced by country Js citizens, their uncompen-
sated demand schedules will be xJ = 12 +
KJ
2pJ
and yJ = p
J
2 +
KJ
2 . The indirect
utility of a single citizen (as well as the total indirect utility) in country J is:
vJ
 
pJ

=

1
2
+
KJ
2pJ
 1
2

pJ
2
+
KJ
2
 1
2
=
pJ +KJ
2 (pJ)
1
2
(3)
3.1.2 Autarchy equilibrium
The equilibrium autarchy price ratio in country J (from now onwards denoted
by pJA) is found by equating domestic demand to domestic supply:
1
2
+
KJ
2pJA
= 1
pJA
2
+
KJ
2
= KJ
4A more general model in which  is allowed to take any value can be simply worked out.
5This is equivalent to thinking that there is only one citizen in each country.
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Solving either of these two equations yields:
pJA = K
J (4)
Standard trade theory tells us that any movement of the price ratio away
from pJA (both upwards and downwards) increases welfare in country J , and that
the larger the change the larger the increase. More formally, vJ(p) > vJ(pJA)
8p 6= pJA, and vJ(p0) > vJ(p) > vJ(pJA) 8p; p0 6= pJA such that either p0 < p < pJA
or p0 > p > pJA.
3.1.3 Trade equilibrium
Lets now consider the situation in which countries can trade. Given that there
are three countries in this world, we can have di¤erent sets of equilibrium price
ratios depending on the countries involved in trade. I will list in parenthesis all
countries that trade with at least one other country: thus, (H;F ) will denote
the case of countries H and F trading to each other, and country E remain-
ing in autarchy. Analogously, the other two possible two-country cases will be
denoted by (H;E) and (F;E); the notation (H;F;E), instead, represents dif-
ferent situations in which all countries trade to at least one other country, but
not necessarily to all. Notice that due to the absence of transport costs, the
equilibrium price ratio will be the same in all the (H;F;E) cases.
The assumption of linear production functions ensures that factor price
equalization obtains (Dixit and Norman, 1980). Thus, we can nd the equi-
librium price ratios conveniently by solving for the integrated trade equilibria,
i.e. by nding the equilibrium price ratio of a single country with endowments
equal to the sum of the national endowments of countries who trade. For ex-
ample, equilibrium prices in the (H;F ) case are found by equating demand and
supply in the integrated setting:
1
2
+
KH
2p
+
1
2
+
KJ
2p
= 2
p
2
+
KH
2
+
p
2
+
KF
2
= KH +KF
Denote by pJ(H;F ) the price ratio faced by citizens in country J when only
H and F trade. Solving either of the two above equations gives:
pH(H;F ) = K
 
1 + 2

pF (H;F ) = K
 
1 + 2

pE(H;F ) = pEA
(5)
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Equilibrium price ratios in all other cases are found similarly:
(F;E) (H;E) (H;F;E)
pH = pHA
pF = K
 
1 + +2

pE = K
 
1 + +2
 p
H = K
 
1 + 2

pF = pFA
pE = K
 
1 + 2
 p
H = K
 
1 + +3

pF = K
 
1 + +3

pE = K
 
1 + +3
 (6)
Given that indirect utility in each country is monotonically increasing in a
change of the price ratio, and considered that 1 + +3 > 1 +

2 ,  2
 

2 ; 

,
citizens in the three countries will have the following preferences over di¤er-
ent trade equilibria (remember that citizens within each country have identical
preferences). For H and F , if  2 0; 2  we have6 :
(F;E)  H(H;E) H (H;F;E) H (H;F )
(H;E)  F (F;E) F (H;F ) F (H;F;E)
If instead  2  2 ; :
(F;E)  H(H;E) H (H;F ) H (H;F;E)
(H;E)  F (F;E) F (H;F;E) F (H;F )
Whats important in the above preference relations is that, when E is rela-
tively labour intensive ( 2 0; 2 ), H prefers to trade with F rather than with
F and E together, while F prefers to trade with H and E together than with
H alone; and that the opposite is true when E is relatively capital intensive
( 2  2 ; ).
For country E, it is su¢ cient to notice that there exist a  () such that if
 2 [0;  ()):
(H;F;E) ; (H;E) E (F;E)
if instead  2 ( () ; ]:
6To simplify the exposition, I am not considering the case in which  = 
2
.
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(H;F;E) ; (F;E) E (H;E)
In words, if E is labour intensive ( 2 [0;  ())) it prefers to have a capital
intensive trading partner like F ; if E is capital intensive ( 2 ( () ; ]) it
prefers to have a labour intensive partner like L. In no circumstance (as long as
0 <  < 1) will E prefer to trade with both H and F together. In the appendix,
I show that  () 2  0; 2  and @()@ > 0 for any .
3.2 Political Model
The political model is adapted from Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006). The
colonial condition of H is modelled in a very simple way: while policy in F
and E is determined freely by their respective governments, policy in H is
determined by the government of country F . The citizens of H can stage a
successful revolution at a stochastic cost: when staged, the revolution is always
successful and H becomes an independent country who is free to have its own
government and to set its own policy. Under the threat of revolution, F can
decide to concede independence to H. Throughout the paper, I assume that
the "government" of a country is simply a citizen of that country selected at
random to chose policy.
3.2.1 Policy
There are two policy instruments: the rst, trade policy, is set in all countries;
the second, a transfer from H to F , is specic to H. For simplicity, I will model
trade policy as 0 or 1 decision speciying whether a country is closed or open
to each of the two other countries. Trade between two countries takes place if
and only if both countries have decided to open up to each other. Trade policy
is described by the following matrix
T =

TH TF TE

=
24THH TFH TEHTHF TFF TEF
THE T
F
E T
E
E
35
where T IJ is 1 if country I is willing to trade with coutnry J , 0 otherwise
(of course, T JJ = 18J). Thus, trade between country I and country J takes
place if and only if T IJ = T
J
I = 1. Mapping from T to the corresponding trade
equilibrium, and using the equations in 5 and 6, we can write pJ as a function
of T,  and  (denote this by pJ(Tj; )). Also, we can dene the gains from
trade accruing to country J as a function of T,  and :
J (Tj; ) = vJ pJ(Tj; )  vJ pJA
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The second policy tool in the model, a transfer from H to F , is specic to
H. For convenience, I will normalize this transfer in terms of Hs gains from
trade: thus, a share  of Hs gains from trade will be transferred to F . The
transfer  is meant to capture in the simplest possible way the fact that gains
from colonial trade were redistributed from colonies to colonizers.
What are the limits of ? As for its upper limit I will assume that this is
1, so that the maximum that F can extract from H is exactly its gains from
trade. This is equivalent to assuming that there is a minimum level of utility
that F can leave H with, and this is equal to autarchy utility. Letting F the
possibility to extract more would not have serious consequences for the result
of the model (as long as the minimum level of utility does not depend on trade
conditions). As for s lower limit, I will let this to be  1, to capture the fact
that F is much richer than H and could decide to transfer (almost) any amount
to H to induce it not to stage a revolution.
3.2.2 Timing
The political state (S) of the model is initially Colonialism, but the citizens
of H can stage a successful Revolution at a stochastic cost vH
 
K

, where
  U [0; 1] - to simplify the notation I have normalized the cost of revolution
by Hs autarchy utility. The timing of the game is the following:
1. Nature choses .
2. F choses whether to remain under Colonialism (S = I) or to grant Inde-
pendence (S = I). If they receive Independence, the citizens of H have
an exogenous (and non appropriable) benet B. Under Colonialism, F
can make concessions: that is it can promise that if H does not stage a
revolution, it will set policies bTH ,bTF and b .
3. If the political state is still Colonialism, citizens in H decide whether to
do a Revolution (S = R) or not. If they do, they obtain independence at
a cost vH
 
K

and become a fully independent country. This gives them
the same exogenous benet B as obtaining Independence in time 2. If F
has granted Independence in time 2, nothing happens at this stage.
4. T and  are simultaneously set. If the political state is Independence,
H sets its own policy freely. If we are still under Colonialism, F must
set TH = bTH ,TF = bTF and  = b with probability ; with probability
1   , it can renege on its promises and set policy freely. Finally, if the
political state is Revolution H sets its own policy freely just like under
Independence, but F sets THF = 0.
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5. Production, trade and consumption take place; all payo¤s are realized.
The assumption that under revolution F must set THF = 0 is crucial to the
results of the model. While punishment is not ex-post optimal in this model,
it could be easily rationalized by saying that F has to defend a reputation as
a punisher of rebel colonies, in the attempt to preserve discipline in the rest of
the empire. All this is exogenous at this stage. See the next section for a brief
discussion of the plausibility of this assumption.
3.3 Equilibrium
Let us now proceed to nd the equilibrium of the model. Solving backwards:
Time 5
Net (after redistribution) indirect utility, V J , depends on the policy choices
made in time 4, as well as on world factor endowments:
V H (T;  j; ) = vH  K+
+(1  )H(Tj; ) +B (7)
V F (T;  j; ) = vF K (1 + )+
+F (Tj; ) + H(Tj; ) (8)
V E (T;  j; ) = vE K (1 + )+
+E(Tj; ) (9)
Where  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if H is free to set its own
policy (if S = I or S = R), and 0 otherwise7 .
Time 4
The equilibrium concept that I will use for the trade policy equilibrium is
that of coalition proof Nash equilibrium. A coalition proof Nash equilibrium is a
set of trade policies such that 1) no single country has an incentive to deviate to
a di¤erent policy; and 2) no coalition of countries has an incentive to coordinate
and deviate to a di¤erent policy. It can be shown8 that:
7Of course, it is only thanks to the linearity of indirect utility in income that we can
redistribute utility from one country to another.
8Proofs to all proposition are in Appendix.
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Proposition 1 Both under Colonialism if F can reset policy, and under In-
dependence, all trade equilibria are of the type (H;F;E) independently on the
endowment parameters. Thus, pJ = K
 
1 + +3
 8J and 8; . Under Revolu-
tion, instead, the type of trade equilibrium depends on  and :
 If  2 [0;  ()), the trade equilibrium is (F;E) and pF = pE = K  1 + +2 ,
pH = pHA ;
 if  2 ( () ; ], the trade equilibrium is (H;E) and pH = pF = K  1 + 2,
pF = p.
Obviously, if under Colonialism F cannot reset policy, the resulting trade
equilibrium will depend on the promises made in time 2 (bTH ,bTF ); for this see
below.
As for the transfer  , it is easy to see that:
Proposition 2 When under Colonialism F can reset policy,  = 1; when in-
stead it has to abide by its promises,  = b . Both under Independence and under
Revolution,  = 0.
Given the mapping between political states and policy, price ratios and gains
from trade can now be written as functions of S,  and  only: pJ(S; ; ),
J (S; ; ).
Time 3
If F has conceded Independence at time 2, nothing happens at this stage.
If, instead, we are still under Colonialism, the citizens of H nds it protable
to do a revolution if and only if
B +H (R; ; )  vH  K >  (1  b)H (C; ; )
where the left-hand side is the sum of the exogenous benet from being free to
set policy, the gains from trade after revolution and the cost of revolution, and
the right-hand side is the expected transfer made by F if revolution does not
take place. The above expression can be re-written as:
 <
B +H (R; ; )   (1  b)H (C; ; )
vH
 
K
 (10)
When 10 holds true, we will say that there is a revolutionary threat. Lets
dene
  B +
H (R; ; )
vH
 
K
 (11)
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which is the cost of revolution above which revolution never takes place (even
if F makes no concessions). Notice that  can be greater than 1.
Time 2
In time 2, F decides whether to grant Independence toH or not. If it doesnt,
it can make concessions bTH ,bTF and b . What determines this decision? Before
answering this question it is useful to notice that, under all circumstances, F
will chose bTH ,bTF in such a way that that the trade equilibrium is of the type
(H;F;E). This is because being the residual claimant of the gains from trade
of H (which is true independently on the size of b), F is always interested in
maximising the joint gains of H and F . This can be stated in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3 Under colonialism, it is always optimal for F to chose bTH andbTF in such a way that the trade equilibrium is of the type (H;F;E), i.e. the
three countries are fully integrated.
Proposition 1 and 3 together imply that the trade equilibrium is the same un-
der Colonialism and under Independence, and that it is the welfare maximising
equilibrium.
In chosing whether to grant Independence or not, and if not, what b to
concede, F maximises its payo¤ as indicated in equation 8. Clearly, if there is
no revolutionary threat ( < ) there Independence will not be granted and
there will be no concessions. Whenever  < , instead, F will need to make
concessions if it wants to avoid Revolution. The minimum concession needed
to stave o¤ Revolution, or the maximum tax that F can say it will charge
(bmax ()), is found by imposing an equality in 10 and solving for b :
bmax () = 1  B +H (R; ; )  vH  K
H (C; ; )
(12)
Obviously, bmax () is decreasing in .
Is it always optimal for F to promise bmax? No: F prefers to make conces-
sions rather than to concede Independence only as long as:
F (C; ; ) + [1   (1  b)] H (C; ; ) > F (I; ; ) (13)
Proposition 1 and 3 together tell us that F (C; ; ) = F (I; ; ). But
then 13 can be solved to nd the minimum level of taxation (bmin) below which
F prefers Independence to Colonialism:
b >  1  

= bmin (14)
13
Setting bmax () = bmin yields the cuto¤ level for the cost of revolution below
which it is optimal for F to grant Independence:
 =
B +H (R; ; ) H (C; k; )
vH
 
K
 (15)
Thus, whenever  < , F choses to stave o¤ revolution by conceding
independence. The crucial point is now to understand how H (R; ; ) and
H (R; ; ) H (C; k; ) (and thus  and ) depend on . Before proceding,
I will make the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 1: F (C; ; ) F (R; ; ) < B < F (C; ; )
The reason why I am introducing Assumption 1 is that it allows us to focus
on the most interesting case, and to highlights the full e¤ects that the evolution
of world endowments can have on colonialism under some conditions. Lets now
analyse how the political state of the model depends on .
If  2 [0;  ()), there are no gains from trade to be made after staging a
revolution (H (R; ; ) = 0). In this case  = B
vH(K)
and under parametric
Assumption 1,  = B 
H(C;k;)
vH(K)
< 0. Thus, concessions are made as soon as
 < min

B
vH(K)
; 1

but independence is never granted.
If  2 ( () ; ], H can trade with E and there are positive gains from trade
to be made after revolution (H (R; ; ) > 0). In this case  = B+
H(R;;)
vH(K)
,
and under Assumption 1  = B+
H(R;;) H(C;k;)
vH(K)
> 0. Thus, concessions
are made as soon as  < min

B+H(R;;)
vH(K)
; 1

, and Independence is granted
when  < .
It is important to notice that (independently on Assumption 1) both  and
 are increasing in : they jump up at  = , and increase continuously as 
increases above  (see the Appendix for a proof).
Time 1
In time 1, Nature choses  and determines the political state of the model
given B,  and . Proposition 4 gives the main result of the paper:
Proposition 4 The political state of the model depends on the cost of revolution
 in the following way:
 If  2 [min (; 1) ; 1], there is no depart from Colonialism and F does not
make any concessions;
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 If  2 [max (0; ) ;min (; 1)], there is no depart from Colonialism but F
must make concessions: it must promise to leave H with at least 1  max
of its gains from trade;
 If  > 0 and  2 [0; ], F cannot stave o¤ Revolution with concessions:
the model predicts a switch from Colonialism to Independence.
Given that both  and  are increasing in , the probability of concessions
under Colonialism and the probability of a switch from Colonialism to Indepen-
dence are non decreasing in . Under parametric Assumption 1, the probability
of Independence is zero if  2 [0;  ()), and positive and strictly increasing in
 if  2 ( () ; ].
4 Discussion
A number of features of this preliminary work deserve some discussion. As I
mentioned above, the political model is inspired by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2006). Apart from the di¤erent economic framework in which it is em-
bedded, my model di¤ers from theirs in one key aspect: the colonizer can always
promise to redistribute enough to avoid Revolution, but does not always nd
it optimal to do it. There are two reasons why Revolution is always avoidable
in my framework: on one hand, Revolution does not allow H to appropriate
resources which are localized in F , but that F can promise to redistribute if
Revolution does not take place (foreign aid). On the other hand part of the
value of Hs domestic product comes from having peaceful trade relation with
F , but F can promise to break this down if Revolution takes place. These
two factors imply that even a Revolution that can be staged at no cost can be
unattractive.
The problem with revolution being always avoidable is that, in order to
make independence possible in equilibrium, one needs to introduce an additional
benet from revolution (B in the model), which needs to be non appropriable by
F (or F would be willing to o¤er just as much to prevent a Revolution). In other
words, the mechanism described by the model per se is not su¢ cient to justify
decolonization. However as long as one is willing to accept that there are benet
from having a national identity, and that these do not depend on world factor
endowments, the model can predict decolonization. In any case, the usefulness
of this class of models does not come from taking them literally but rather from
understanding the mechanism that they highlight. What my model highlights
is how changing trade conditions make decolonization potentially more likely.
The fact that trade gets disrupted after revolution is crucial to the result
of the paper. In fact, one contribution of this paper is to formalize in a rather
simple and exible way the idea according to which trade dependence creates
political dependence9 . In the model, H is more likely to be subjogated to F as
long as the latter represent the only viable trade opportunity. Were F unable
to credibly threaten trade disruption after Revolution, this mechanism would
9Notice that the issue of how trade dependence creates political dependence is much wider
than it is presented in this model. However, there has been little formal work on this issue.
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break down. In other words, trade dependence can create political dependence,
but only as long as sanctions are credible. While punishment is not ex-post
optimal in this model, it could be rationalized by arguing that F has to defend
a reputation as a punisher of rebel colonies: this has some empirical support.
In fact, it is true that colonies who revolted against their masters were often
punished through some sort of (at least temporary) trade sanctions: for example,
this was the case of the US in the 30 years after 1776.
5 Conclusions
I have built a simple trade model of colonialism, linking decolonization to the
evolution of worlds factor endowments. The key feature of colonialism in this
model is that it is an instrument through which colonisers can appropriate part
of the gains from colonial trade accruing to colonies. As long as the rest of the
world is more similar to the colony than to the colonizer in terms of factor en-
dowments (at least for what concerns the main exports of the colony) Revolution
is very unlikely. This is because the colonizer can credibly threaten not to trade
with the colony anymore, posing a formidable threat to the colonys national
income. If the rest of the world is more similar to the colonizer, however, trade
sanctions represent a much less formidable deterrent, and private incentives to
insurgence go up. This makes decolonization more likely.
The model presented in this paper is still very preliminary, but provides a
basic theoretical framework which can be used to usefully think about possible
theoretical extensions, and to carry out some anecdotic empirical work. On the
side of extending the model, I am mainly interested in modelling the colonial
society as divided into an elite and a mass of citizens. As explained in Section
2, this captures well the structure of most colonial societies, except perhaps for
British settlerscolonies and a few others. I am interested in understanding how
the existence of a colonial elite inuenced the pace and modes of decolonization,
and how this mapped into post-colonial institutional development. In perspec-
tive, this could provide an additional theoretical explanation for the relation
between the share of settlers in the population and institutional development
(Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001).
On the empirical side, I am working at a number of case studies on British
settlerscolonies: for the homogeneity of their society, these seem to resemble
most the simple world described in my model. Several such colonies (Canada,
Australia, New Zealand) have received early independence by "voluntary" deci-
sion of Great Britain. A rst-cut analysis seems to conrm that independence
came about at a time of large changes in colonial trade patterns, ones that made
the colonies less dependent on the British market.
Finally, I am nding that a huge amount of data on colonial nance and
trade patterns is available at the British Public Record O¢ ce: this hints at the
possibility of testing a richer model of trade and decolonization in a rigorous
manner, at least for the case of British colonialism.
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6 Appendix
Properties of  () - Using 3 and 6,  () is found by solving:
 () = arg
8<:

K
 
1 + 2

+K (1 + )

2K
 
1 + 2
 1
2
=

K
 
1 + +2

+K (1 + )

2K
 
1 + +2
 1
2
9=;
= arg

32 +
 
4  2    22 = 0	
=
1
6
+
1
6
p
16+ 2 + 16  2
3
It is easy to see that @
()
@ > 0; let us now study the properties of
()
 :
 ()

=
1
6

+
p
2 + 16+ 16  4

It is easy to check that 
()
 =
1
2 when  = 0; further, it is possible to check
that @ 
()
 =@ is negative 8 > 0. 
Proofs of proposition 1 - In order to keep things simple and meaningful,
I am only focusing on equilibria in which countries do not make unilateral trade
attempts. For convenience, I am reporting the preferences of countries over
alternative trade equilibria. For H and F , if  2 0; 2 ,
(F;E)  H(H;E) H (H;F;E) H (H;F )
(H;E)  F (F;E) F (H;F ) F (H;F;E)
If instead  2  2 ; ,
(F;E)  H(H;E) H (H;F ) H (H;F;E)
(H;E)  F (F;E) F (H;F;E) F (H;F )
For country E, if  2 [0;  ()),
(H;F;E) ; (H;E) E (F;E)
if  2 ( () ; ],
(H;F;E) ; (F;E) E (H;E)
Let us rst focus on the case of unconstrained colonialism. Given that F
sets the trade policy for H, there are only two players in the trade game under
Colonialism (F and E). Given that  = 1 when F can reset policy, F will fully
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internalize the e¤ect that any trade policy on Hs indirecty utility. Thus, the
objective function of F will be:
	 = vH

pH (Tj; )+ vF pF (Tj; )
To proof that the no equilibrium exists outside of the class (H;F;E), notice
that no equilibrium can leave either H or F in autarchy, as F can decide to open
up trade between H and F and this would always increase both vH

pH (Tj; )
and vF

pF (Tj; ) and therefore 	. Further, (H;F ) is not an equilibrium as
opening up to E is always welfare maximising for F . To see this, use 3 to write
	 as a function of a common price in (H;F ):
	(p) =
p+K
2p
1
2
+
p+K (1 + )
2p
1
2
= p
1
2 +K

1 +

2

p 
1
2
The rst derivative of 	(p) is:
@	(p)
@p
=
1
2
p 
1
2
"
1  K
 
1 + 2

p
#
A visual analysis of @	(p)@p immediately shows that 	(p) achieves a minimum
at p = K
 
1 + 2

. Thus, opening up to E is always protable.
Within the class (H;F;E), it is easy to see that all countries trading to
all countries is an equilibrium. This is because the only way E can change the
equilibrium price is by retreaing into autarchy, and no alternative trade outcome
is strictly better from Fs point of view.
Case of Independence. To proof that no equilibrium must lie in the class
(H;F;E), notice that no equilibrium can leave either H or F in autarchy: this
is because the two would always agree to trade to each other, since this would
make them both better o¤. But notice also that H and F cannot be trading
alone: is this was the case, either F (if  2 0; 2 ) or H (if  2 2 ; ) would
reach a mutual agreement with E to allow it into trade.
Next, I will show that it is always an equilibrium that all countries trade to
all countries. The only price-changing deviation available to individual countries
is to retire into autarchy, which is never optimal to chose. For the same reason,
no three country coalition can deviate without damaging at least one of its
members. As for two-country coalition, notice that H and F cannot agree to
exclude E, as this would always damage one of the two; further, H would always
oppose to exclude F and F to exclude H.
Case of revolution. Given that TFH is bound to be set at 0, the fact that I
am not considering equilibria in which countries make unilateral trade attempts
implies that THF is also bound to be 0. Further, T
H
E = 1 and T
F
E = 1 are
strictly dominant strategies, and therefore bound to be always used in a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, the structure of the equilibrium will depend entirely on the
trade policy chosen by E; from preferences, we know that this will be TEH = 0
and TEF = 1 if  2 [0;  ()], TEH = 1 and TEF = 0 if  2 [ () ; ].
Proof of Proposition 3 - It is su¢ cient to realize that F is the residual
claimant to 	, and invoke the proof of Proposition 1. 
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Properties of  - The crucial requirement is that @

@ > 0 for  > 
 In
order to prove this, it is su¢ cient to prove that
@[H(R;;) H(C;k;)]
@ > 0:
@

H (R; ; ) H (C; k; )
@
=
@

vH

K
 
1 + 2
  vH K  1 + +3 
@
It is possible to show numerically that, while this is negative for low values
of , it is positive for all  > , and all  > 14 . 
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